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In a most unusual chapter, it will now be discussed whether parents have 
a legal right to take their gravely ill children home to die. After four 
unsuccessful public appeals, there were two additional private hearings 
for baby Charlie Gard to focus solely on the time and place of his death.1 
Chris Gard and Connie Yates, his parents, tried to control his ending to 
spend “precious time” with their son but the High Court, after hearing 
arguments from Great Ormond Street Hospital (GOSH), refused to 
grant their wishes. On what legal ground might the parents have argued 
a case for taking their son home to die?2  
Four potential legal avenues will be explored: (i) the current law on 
parental autonomy will be studied in the narrow context of death to 
reveal if there is a right to take a child home to die; (ii) the common law 
of best interests will also be studied to reveal if a home death could be in 
the “best interests” of a child; (iii) a new avenue will be explored in “care” 
law under the Children Act 1989 (if ventilation is removed in a hospital 
setting first); and (iv) it will be debated whether attempting to control the 
                                                          
1 On Tuesday, 25th July 2017, and Thursday, 27th July 2017, in the High Court 
(unreported). 
2 The main legal issue for Alfie Evans was international travel to the Vatican 
after his brain, due to an unknown progressive disorder, had all but wasted away: 
Evans & James v Alder Hey Children’s NHS Foundation Trust & Evans [2018] 
EWCA 984 (Civ), but for Charlie Gard, the legal fight went one step further to 






death of a child is simply a “preference” or “desire” that, owing to its 
impractical nature, could not be enforced in court.  
It will be concluded that notwithstanding a peaceful environment, 
parents do not have an absolute legal right to control the death of their 
child, particularly when the plan involves futile treatment at home to 
“buy more time.” However, if palliative care is viewed as “care” rather 
than “treatment” it may be administered at home under the Children Act 
1989 as long as it does not cause significant harm to the child. 
 
II. “A Mother’s Promise” 
 
We start from the final public appeal hearing dated Monday 24th July 
2017 – Great Ormond Street Hospital v Yates, Gard & Gard3 - whereby 
Charlie’s parents accepted after fresh scans that their son was beyond 
medical help and discussions turned to taking him home to die.4 GOSH 
attended the first of two private hearings the next day to draw up an end-
of-life plan for Charlie, and outlined in a position statement the wishes 
of the parents in clear terms: “Charlie’s parents want him to be with them 
and ventilated at home for several days before receiving palliative care.”5 
Their barrister Grant Armstrong described it as “their final wish” to 
experience “tranquillity outside the hospital” with their son, to have a 
choice in “the circumstances in which Charlie’s passing will be 
conducted” before he died, and to spend the “maximum amount of time 
                                                          
3 [2017] EWHC 1909 (Fam). 
4 For a discussion on the issues raised by the Gard appeals, see: D. Wilkinson 
and J. Savulescu. “Hard Lessons: Learning From the Charlie Gard Case,” Journal 
of Medical Ethics, published online: 2 August 2017, doi: 10.1136/medethics-2017-
104492; J. Bridgeman. “Gard and Yates v GOSH, the Guardian and the United 
Kingdom: Reflections on the Legal Process and the Legal Principles,” Medical 
Law International 17:4 (2017): 285-302; E. Cave, E. Nottingham. “Who Knows 
Best (Interests)? The Case of Charlie Gard,” Medical Law Review 26:3 (2018): 500; 
J. Lombard. “Navigating the Decision-Making Framework for Patients in a 
Minimally Conscious State,” Medico-Legal Journal of Ireland 22:2, (2016): 78-87; and 
A. A. Sheikh. “Medico-Legal Issues at The End of Life: Recent Highlights,” 
Medico-Legal Journal of Ireland 23:1 (2017): 2-7. 
5 Great Ormond Street Hospital, statement dated 25th July 2017, at paragraph 3. 
https://www.serjeantsinn.com/news/charlie-gard-position-statements/ 
(accessed November 3, 2018).  




they have left with Charlie.”6 The High Court was called upon to approve 
a plan because the hospital would not let Chris and Connie take Charlie 
home for a further week of futile intensive care, causing talks with 
palliative care consultants at the hospital to break down.7 GOSH felt that 
a dignified death was at risk:  
 
Charlie is a child who requires highly specialised treatment. 
His care cannot be simplified. It must be provided in a 
specialist setting by specialists. It is in Charlie’s best interests 
that the risk of a precipitate, distressing or disordered death 
is removed so that he may be assured of a peaceful and 
dignified passing.8  
 
GOSH put a suggestion forward - a family-friendly hospice - but time 
would be limited because it was not licensed or insured to deliver 
intensive care overnight.9 Mr Justice Francis gave the parents two days 
to find an intensive care team for their flat or the hospice who were 
willing to provide futile intensive care, but hinted that a hospice, with 
removal of ventilation shortly afterwards, was the realistic option.10 Chris 
and Connie were unable to do so. Mr Justice Francis therefore ruled in 
the final private hearing on Thursday, 27th July 2017, that Charlie was to 
be moved to a hospice the next day and extubated within a few hours of 
arrival. Connie Yates expressed her sadness when leaving the High 
Court:  
 
[GOSH has] denied us our final wish. We just want some 
peace with our son – no hospital, no courts, no media – just 
quality time with Charlie away from everything to say 
goodbye to him in the most loving way. We’ve had no 
control over our son’s life and no control over our son’s 
                                                          
6 R. Mendick, D. Boyle. “Charlie Gard’s Parents Accuse Hospital of Blocking 
‘Final Wish’ for Baby to be Allowed Home to Die,” The Telegraph, 25th July 2017. 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk. 
7 See GOSH statement dated 25th July 2017, at paragraph 2. 
https://www.serjeantsinn.com/news/charlie-gard-position-statements/ 
(accessed November 3, 2018). 
8 Ibidem, paragraphs 1-5. 
9 Ibidem, paragraphs 8-9. 
10 M. Holden. “Parents, UK Hospital Clash Over Taking Baby Charlie Gard 





death. I’m shocked that after all we’ve been through, they 
won’t allow us extra time…we promised Charlie every day 
we would take him home. It seems really upsetting, after 
everything we’ve been through, to deny us this.11  
 
GOSH responded in a statement that it had  
 
tried absolutely everything to accommodate their final 
wishes…including exploring the unprecedented step of 
delivering intensive life support away from a hospital 
intensive care unit [but] there is simply no way that Charlie, 
a patient with such severe and complex needs, can spend any 
significant time outside of an intensive care environment 
safely. The risk of an unplanned and chaotic end to Charlie’s 
life is an unthinkable outcome for all concerned and would 
rob his parents of precious moments with him.12  
 
On the morning of Friday, 28th July 2017, hospice staff transferred 
Charlie and his parents to a hospice 45 minutes away and they had a few 
hours to say goodbye. They took him into the garden, made casts of his 
hands and feet, and took plenty of pictures with him. The ventilator was 
disconnected at 15:12 PM and he died twelve minutes later. Charlie was 
given a temperature-assisted “Cuddle Cot” so his parents could take him 
home (the equivalent of lying in state) for a few days.  
On the face of it, the final wish of the parents does seem 
understandable in the circumstances. So, were they right? Did they have 
a legal right to take Charlie home to die? The answer is, it depends on 
whether medical treatment is involved in the plan as to how much 
control is enjoyed. Chris and Connie did not only wish to take Charlie 
                                                          
11 Press Association. “Charlie Gard’s Parents Prepare for Final Farewell After 
Hospice Move,” Daily Mail, 28th July 2017. https://www.dailymail.co.uk; 
“Charlie Gard’s Parents Denied Final Wish After Judge Approves Hospice 
Plan,” Daily Mail, 10th August 2017. https://www.dailymail.co.uk; and M. 
Robinson. “Charlie Gard’s Anguished Parents Concede He Must End His Days 
in Hospice – Yet They Still Cannot Agree with Doctors How He Should be 
Cared for in his Last Hours,” Daily Mail, 28th July 2017. 
https://www.dailymail.co.uk. 
12 Great Ormond Street Hospital, 27th July 2017. 
https://www.gosh.nhs.uk/news/latest-press-releases/latest-statement-gosh-
patient-charlie-gard (accessed November 3, 2018). 




home to die, but they wished to administer futile intensive care for an 
additional week in their ground floor flat, without a specialised team, to 
say goodbye to their son in their own time and on their own terms. This 
plan caused legal difficulties because of its futility. The four potential 
legal avenues for parents in this unusual situation are now explored 
below. 
 
A. Avenue 1: Does the Existing Law on Parental Autonomy Support 
Control Over Death? 
 
The definition of “parental responsibility” under section 3(1) of the 
Children Act 1989 is very wide, including: “the rights, duties, powers, 
responsibilities and authority which by law a parent of a child has in 
relation to the child and his property.”13 It is also a criminal offence to 
fail to provide “medical aid” to a child under section 1(2)(a) of the 
Children and Young Persons Act 1933. The common law regarding 
parental authority, however, is also clear that even though parents must 
make decisions about medical treatment, parental authority is subservient 
to the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court.14 So, can parental 
authority be extended to cover the death of a child? There are flickers of 
support for this idea in the case law. Lord Bingham MR in Re Z 
(Identification: Restrictions on Publication)15 noted that: “I would accept 
without reservation that the decision of a devoted and responsible parent 
should be treated with respect. It should certainly not be disregarded or 
lightly set aside.”16 A unique scenario occurred in Re T (A Minor) 
(Wardship: Medical Treatment)17 whereby the parents of a young boy 
refused a liver transplant for their son and the court supported this 
decision:  
 
                                                          
13 Parents have a “large measure of autonomy in the way in which they discharge 
their parental responsibilities” according to R v Secretary of State for Education and 
Employment and Others [2005] UKHL 15, per Baroness Hale of Richmond at 
paragraph 72. 
14 Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2000] Fam 147 at 178-179; 
and Re W (A Minor) (Medical Treatment: Court’s Jurisdiction) [1993] Fam 64 at 78. 
15 [1997] Fam. 1. 
16 Ibidem, pp. 32-33. 





The welfare of this child depends on his mother. She will 
have to comply with the court order, return to this country 
and present the child to one of the hospitals. She will have 
to arrange to remain in this country for the foreseeable 
future. Will the father stay in country AB and work or come 
with her to England, giving up his job and having to seek 
another job? If he does not come she will have to manage 
unaided. How will the mother cope? I believe that the best 
interests of this child require that his future treatment should 
be left in the hands of his devoted parents.18 
 
The decision in Re T allowed the parents to reject a life-saving liver 
transplant for their son due to lifestyle, stress, travel, and employment 
factors. It was also confirmed in Glass v United Kingdom19 that to treat a 
child without the consent of the parent interferes with the human rights 
of the patient (Article 8) and that in the event of a disagreement, court 
approval is required.20 Glass concerned treatment rather than withdrawal, 
but it places parents in a position of authority whereby their consent (or 
lack thereof) is the gateway to medical treatment, rendering doctors 
powerless until the court intervenes.21 Parental autonomy is also 
supported by section 31(2) of the Children Act 1989 whereby a court’s 
jurisdiction is limited to making care or supervision orders if a child is 
likely to suffer “significant harm” through unreasonable parenting. On 
the face of it, the ambit of parental responsibility appears to be wide 
enough to include death. 
However, the question of whether parents have authority over the 
death of their child ultimately rests on whether medical treatment is part 
of the plan and the doctors agree with it. Lord Oliver stated in KD (A 
                                                          
18 Ibidem, pp. 250-255. For a detailed critical analysis of this case, see: M. Fox 
and J. McHale. “In Whose Best Interests?,” Modern Law Review 60 (1997): 700-
709. 
19 [2004] 39 EHRR 15. 
20 Ibidem, paragraphs 70 and 75. It was also confirmed in Lambert v France [2016] 
62 EHRR 2 that court is the best option when doubts arise as to the best 
interests of the patient (at paragraph 143). 
21 This was supported in Re B (A Minor) (Wardship: Sterilisation) [1988] A.C. 199; 
Re W (A Minor) [1993] Fam. 64; Re J (Specific Orders: Child’s Religious Upbringing and 
Circumcision) [2000] 1 FLR 571; and B (Child) [2003] EWCA Civ 1148. 




Minor) (Ward: Termination of Access)22 that: “the natural bond and 
relationship between parent and child gives rise to universally recognised 
norms which ought not to be gratuitously interfered with and which, if 
interfered with at all, ought to be so only if the welfare of the child 
dictates it.”23 In Gard, the court ruled that it did not support the welfare 
of Charlie to continue his ventilation,24 meaning that when Chris and 
Connie proposed to continue the futile intensive care at home, the court 
was entitled to intervene. The hospital was also under no obligation to 
support the ventilation once it was rendered futile.25 It could also be said 
that the decision in Re T was wrongly decided because it placed a greater 
weight on the lifestyle of the mother than the grave predicament of her 
son. It has not been followed by any other case since. 
The parental autonomy avenue is therefore unavailable to parents 
wishing to take their child home to die if their wish includes futile 
treatment: the court can simply override their wish to ensure that the 
child is spared treatment that is not in his best interests.  
 
B. Avenue 2: can it be in a child’s “best interests” to die at home? 
 
A second possibility is whether the best interests test can be interpreted 
to include a home death. This may offset the futility of the treatment, for 
example, if there is some form of benefit to be gleaned.26 This route may 
be phrased as follows: “is the continuation of treatment at home with the 
ultimate aim of ending life surrounded by family in the best interests of 
the child?” The case law on best interests supports a comprehensive test 
which could include a home death. For example, the case of Re A (Male 
                                                          
22 [1988] AC 806. 
23 Ibidem, pp. 824-825. 
24 Great Ormond Street Hospital v Yates, Gard & Gard [2017] EWHC 972 (Fam). 
25 Indeed, the case of Portsmouth NHS Trust v W [2005] EWHC 2293 confirms 
that a doctor need not act if it is against his “professional conscience, intuition 
or hunch” per Hedley J at paragraph 56, following on from Lord Donaldson 
MR in two cases: Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1991] Fam 33 at 
41; and Re J (A Minor) (Child in Care: Medical Treatment) [1992] 3 WLR 507 at 516.  
26 The best interests test is only applicable if medical treatment is involved in the 
home death, so if the parents agree to withdrawal in a hospital and then take their 
child home to die, there may be no need for a best interests test. This option 





Sterilisation)27 interpreted “best interests” to include “medical, emotional, 
and all other welfare issues.”28 An NHS Trust v MB29 also interpreted best 
interests “in the widest sense” to form a balance sheet of benefits and 
burdens, including “medical, emotional, sensory and instinctive 
considerations.”30 Aintree University Hospital NHS Trust v James31 added 
that: “decision makers must look at welfare in the widest sense, not just 
medical but social and psychological.”32 These judgments support the 
idea that a gravely ill child could die at home surrounded by family if this 
provides him with an emotional benefit.  
However, should that child be unconscious and any emotional or 
physical benefit be removed, the question then boils down to simply: “is 
the continuation of futile treatment in the best interests of the child?” 
The cases cited above are not so supportive when read in the context of 
futility. Re A, for example, stated that “speculative benefits” are not part 
of the best interests test,33 and in Gard where the court confirmed that 
there was “nothing to be put on the other side of the balance in favour 
of preserving life,”34 it is highly unlikely that a child would glean any 
(even a speculative) benefit from being taken home for futile treatment 
so as to fulfil the desires of his parents. The court in MB also rejected the 
“wholly irrelevant” wishes of the parents, meaning that the home death 
would have to confer an actual benefit to the child to be considered.35 
The court in Portsmouth NHS Trust v Wyatt36 raised concerns that the 
parents were “projecting [their] intuitive feelings” onto their gravely ill 
daughter and found that prolonging her life to allow her parents to 
                                                          
27 [2000] 1 FLR 549. 
28 Ibidem, per Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss P at p. 555. 
29 [2006] EWHC 507. 
30 Ibidem, per Holman J. at paragraph 16. See also: An NHS Trust v A [2007] 
EWHC 1696, per Holman J. at paragraph 40. 
31 [2013] UKSC 67. 
32 Ibidem, per Lady Hale at paragraph 39. 
33 Re A (n 27) per Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss P at p. 555. 
34 Yates & Gard v Great Ormond Street Hospital [2017] EWCA Civ 410, 23rd May 
2017, per Lord Justice McFarlane at paragraph 48. 
35 NHS Trust v MB [2006] EWHC 507, per Holman J. at paragraph 16. 
36 [2004] EWHC 2247 (Fam). 




control her death was not in her best interests.37 Re L (A Child) (Medical 
Treatment: Benefit)38 - with remarkably similar facts to Gard – also 
determined that even though the term “medical interests” included the 
emotional need of the baby to bond with his mother, the medical 
treatment was futile, rendering the balance sheet in favour of 
withdrawal.39 Therefore, the best interests test when applied to a home 
death leads to the same negative result as seen in Gard if medical 
treatment is involved: the continuance of futile treatment will not be in 
the best interests of the child. The only benefit is to the parents. It is a 
well-established principle going back to Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical 
Treatment)40 that futile treatment must be withdrawn, as per Lord 
Donaldson MR: “in the end there will be cases in which the answer must 
be that it is not in the interests of the child to subject it to treatment 
which will cause increased suffering and produce no commensurate 
benefit.”41 
It is worth noting that substituted judgment is also not an option. 
Desperate parents may use phrases such as: “he would have wanted it” 
or “this would have been his wish if he were awake” to substitute the 
consent of the child, but the idea of a substituted judgment was removed 
from minors in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland42 and removed from 
incompetent adults in Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation).43 A best interests 
test is now deemed more appropriate.44 There is a glimpse of substituted 
                                                          
37 Per Hedley J. at paragraph 34. For further discussion, see: M. Brazier, “An 
Intractable Dispute: When Parents and Professionals Disagree,” Medical Law 
Review 13:3 (2005): 412. 
38 [2004] EWHC 2713. 
39 Ibidem, per Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss P at paragraph 26. 
40 [1991] Fam. 33. 
41 Ibidem, p. 47. 
42 [1993] AC 789, per Lord Goff and Lord Mustill at pages 871-872 and 894-895 
respectively. 
43 [1990] 2 AC 1, per Lord Brandon at 55.  
44 For further discussion on the inappropriateness of substituted judgment on 
minors, see: L. Cherkassky. “Children and the Doctrine of Substituted 
Judgment,” Medical Law International 1 (2015): 1-23; D. Tomkin, P. Hanafin. 
“Medical Treatment at Life’s End: The Need for Legislation,” Medico-Legal 





judgment in Aintree whereby Lady Hale said: “[the doctors] must try and 
put themselves in the place of the individual patient and ask what his 
attitude to the treatment is or would be likely to be,”45 but this was an 
incompetent adult case whereas the statutory best interests test under 
section 4(6) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 requires the medical team 
to ascertain the wishes and feelings of the patient during his competent 
years. It does not substitute his judgment - it tries to ascertain his actual 
judgment - and so it would not be applicable to children who had not yet 
lived a full life. The best interests’ avenue is therefore closed to parents 
if futile treatment is involved in the home death. 
 
C. Avenue 3: a new approach under Care Law  
 
Let us now remove futile medical treatment from the equation and 
simply pose the legal question as follows: “do parents have a right to take 
their gravely ill child home to die?” The answer appears to be “yes.”  
Parents who agree to withdraw ventilation at the hospital before 
taking their child home remove any medical element from the equation, 
leaving the Children Act 1989 to govern their parental responsibility 
under “care” law. This requires a welfare test under section 1(1) which 
stipulates: “when a court determines any question with respect to the 
upbringing of a child, the child’s welfare shall be the court’s paramount 
consideration,” but a court can only intervene and apply this test if there 
is a risk of “significant harm” to the child under section 31(2), which 
states:  
 
A court may only make a care order or supervision order if 
it is satisfied that the child concerned is suffering, or is likely 
to suffer, significant harm and that the harm, or likelihood 
of harm, is attributable to the care given to the child, or likely 
to be given to him if the order were not made, not being 
                                                          
Wind: Substituted Judgment and End-of-life Decisions for Minors,” Medico-
Legal Journal of Ireland 19:1 (2013): 11. 
45 Aintree (n 31), paragraph 39. 




what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give to 
him.46  
 
A home death has not yet been debated within the context of care 
law, nor has a court yet ruled on it, but perhaps it may offer a legal avenue 
for future cases like Charlie Gard?47 
Chris Gard and Connie Yates did try to exert their parental authority 
using section 31(2) to argue that taking Charlie abroad for innovative 
treatment did not breach the threshold of significant harm and therefore 
the courts had no place to intervene. This was successful in the earlier 
case of Re King48 whereby Baker J said:  
 
it is a fundamental principle of family law in this jurisdiction 
that responsibility for making decisions about a child rest 
with his parents. In most cases, the parents are the best 
people to make decisions about a child and the State – 
whether it be the court, or any other public authority – has 
no business interfering with the exercise of parental 
responsibility unless the child is suffering or is likely to suffer 
significant harm as a result of the care given to the child not 
being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to 
give.49  
 
Nevertheless, Lord Justice McFarlane in the Court of Appeal in 
Gard50 quickly rejected the idea that care law could govern medical 
treatment and restated the importance of the common law of best 
interests:  
 
Best interests is the established yardstick which applies to all 
cases…Mr Justice Baker’s words provide no basis for saying 
that he was holding that any test based on significant harm 
                                                          
46 For further discussion, see: C. Auckland and I. Goold. “Defining the Limits 
of Parental Autonomy: Charlie Gard, Best Interests and Risk of Significant 
Harm Threshold,” Law Quarterly Review 134 (2018): 37-42. 
47 It should be noted, however, that pain relief (palliative care) may be considered 
medical treatment, so there might still be medical interference with parental 
autonomy. This is unclear without existing case law. 
48 [2014] EWHC 2964. 
49 Ibidem, paragraphs 31 and 34. 





is to be applied to cases relating to the medical treatment of 
children.51  
 
However, should Chris and Connie have agreed to withdraw 
ventilation at the hospital and then take Charlie home to die, the need for 
a best interests test would have dissolved, paving the way for the 1989 
Act. The legal question would then be rephrased as follows: does taking 
Charlie home to die carry a risk of significant harm under section 31 of 
the 1989 Act? One can only imagine that, with adequate pain relief, and 
notwithstanding his inevitable natural death, the answer would be “no.” 
There may be a potential barrier to this legal avenue. No common 
law exists at present, but a local authority may disagree with the parents 
that taking their child home to die will not cause him significant harm. 
This impasse would result in the High Court invoking its inherent 
jurisdiction to rule on the matter under section 100(4) of the 1989 Act, 
which states that the court must have “reasonable cause to believe” that 
if its inherent jurisdiction is not exercised, a child will suffer “significant 
harm.” The courts may find it harder to overrule parents in a “death 
only” scenario if the parents have already agreed to withdraw futile 
treatment in the hospital.  
The recent case of Re C (Children)52 demonstrates how the law works 
in practice and how the courts might deal with a home death scenario. A 
mother wished to name her daughter “Cyanide,” so the local authority 
sought the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under section 100(4) 
of the 1989 Act. The three legal questions to be answered at appeal were: 
(i) whether the local authority had the statutory power to prevent the 
parents from naming their children; (ii) whether the local authority, if 
they did have this power, needed to ask the court to sanction its 
authority, and (iii) whether the naming of children was serious enough to 
come under the inherent jurisdiction of the court. All three questions 
were answered affirmatively, allowing the court to explain in detail why 
certain “unusual, bizarre, extreme or foolish” parents required court 
intervention.53  
                                                          
51 Ibidem, paragraphs 74 and 104. 
52 [2016] EWCA Civ 374. 
53 Ibidem, per King LJ, paragraph 105. 




In answer to the first question, the local authority did have the power 
under section 33(3)(b) of the 1989 Act to determine how parents meet 
their parental responsibility, which states:  
 
while a care order is in force with respect to a child, the local 
authority designated by the order shall: (a) have parental 
responsibility for the child, and (b) have the power to 
determine the extent to which [a parent] may meet his 
parental responsibility for him.”  
 
Lady Justice King described this provision as a “trump card” allowing 
a local authority to intervene with the “rights, duties, powers, 
responsibilities and authority” of parents under section 3(1).54 There are 
limitations to this power listed under sections 33(6) and (7) whereby the 
local authority cannot act without a court order (such as taking a child 
abroad) but nothing is listed about forenames, allowing the local 
authority in Re C to: “exercise its parental responsibility under section 
33(3) in order to prevent the mother from giving her twins the forenames 
of her choice.”55 A home death would come under the ambit of section 
33(3)(b) because it is not carved out as an exception under sections 33(6) 
and (7) requiring a court order. The local authority has the statutory 
authority to intervene with preventative measures. 
In answer to the second question, the local authority was right to ask 
the court to sanction its statutory power owing to the potential breach 
of the human rights of the parents (per Lady Justice King):  
 
the mother has a safety net in that she may apply for an 
injunction under section 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998 … 
such a decision involves such a serious invasion of the 
Article 8 rights of the mother that I am satisfied that the 
court should invoke its inherent jurisdiction in order that it 
may either sanction the local authority’s proposed course of 
action as in the interests of the child.56  
 
                                                          
54 Ibidem, paragraphs 59 and 64. 
55 Ibidem, per King LJ, paragraphs 61, 65 and 66. 
56 Ibidem, per King LJ, paragraphs 75, 77 and 98. King LJ also confirmed that 
the court was there to “limit, circumscribe or sanction” the existing power of 
the local authority under section 33(3)(b), not “confer” the power onto the local 





A home death is also a private and family matter, so an action by the 
local authority to prevent it may constitute an unjustifiable interference 
of the right to respect for the private and family life of the family (both 
the parents and the child) under Article 8 of the European Convention 
of Human Rights.57 The local authority, therefore, notwithstanding its 
statutory powers under section 33(3)(b) to prevent the home death to 
avoid significant harm to the child, may still have to invoke the inherent 
jurisdiction of the court to sanction its preventative measures. It would 
then be for the court to decide whether there is an unjustified 
interference under Article 8 and whether there is a risk of significant 
harm to the child. There is no indication as of yet as to how the court 
would decide this matter. 
In answer to the third question, and notwithstanding the potential 
human rights breach, naming a child “Cyanide” was deemed by Lady 
Justice King to be serious enough to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of 
the court. The “significant harm” test under section 31(2) was applied at 
this point to answer the pivotal question posed by section 100(4): 
“whether there is reasonable cause to believe that if the court’s inherent 
jurisdiction is not exercised with respect to the child [she] is likely to 
suffer significant harm.”58 Lady Justice King concluded that:  
 
in my judgment, although it will only rarely be the case, there 
is every reason to believe that if the court’s inherent 
jurisdiction is not invoked in order to prevent the girl child 
from being named Cyanide, she is likely to suffer significant 
harm.59  
 
King LJ then carved out a “special category” of cases for future 
reference that could be applicable to home deaths:  
 
I have reached the conclusion that there is a small category 
of cases where, notwithstanding the local authority’s powers 
under section 33(3)(b), the consequences of the exercise of a 
particular act of parental responsibility are so profound and 
have such an impact on either the child or the Article 8 rights 
                                                          
57 Ibidem, per King LJ, paragraph 75. 
58 Ibidem, per King LJ, paragraph 101. 
59 Ibidem, paragraph 102. 




of those other parties, that the matter must come before the 
court for its determination.60  
 
It is highly probable in a home death scenario that taking a child home 
to die falls within the “special category of cases” that requires court 
approval. This is because, first, the child may suffer intense pain or 
distress once his life-sustaining treatment has been removed. Secondly 
and conversely, the consequences of not letting the parents do this would 
almost certainly interfere with their rights under Article 8.61 It is also fair 
to say that, if the name “Cyanide” is deemed by the courts to cause 
significant harm, then taking a gravely ill child out of hospital will almost 
certainly attract the attention of the law. 
The first home death case, therefore, may decide the following: (i) the 
local authority has the statutory power to prevent parents from taking 
their child home to die under section 33(3)(b) because it is not listed as 
an exception requiring a court order under sections 33(6) and (7) of the 
1989 Act; (ii) the local authority will need to ask the court to sanction its 
preventative measures because a home death falls into a special category 
of cases whereby the human rights of numerous parties may be interfered 
with; and (iii) a home death is serious enough to fall within the inherent 
jurisdiction of the court because of the risk of significant harm to the 
child. It is very difficult to predict how the court will answer this final 
and pivotal question, but the complexity of the grave illness and the level 
of pain relief will be decisive factors. In favour of the parents, palliative 
care is easier to administer at home than intensive care, and once the 
medical treatment of a child ceases, the hospital has no legal grounds 
upon which to further detain the patient. This would be a deprivation of 
his liberty under Article 5 (a theory also unexplored by the courts in the 
context of home death thus far).62 
                                                          
60 Ibidem, paragraph 104. 
61 It was confirmed in Lambert v France [2016] 62 EHRR 2 that relatives who 
were also victims of a human rights breach may have scope for an action under 
human rights law. 
62 It should be noted, however, that this section is underpinned by the 
assumption that “medical treatment” stops when ventilation is withdrawn. If 
palliative care (pain relief) is considered to be medical treatment too, we have a 
completely different scenario: we return back to the “doctors versus parents” 






D. Avenue 4: it is not a legal right but a fanciful whim dependent on 
practicalities 
 
Chris Gard and Connie Yates asked to take Charlie home for an extra 
week of futile intensive care before withdrawing his ventilation. This idea 
has now been explored and it is clear that parents do not have a legal 
right to continue futile medical treatment in order to create an “ideal” 
death for their child. The cases of Re King63 and Re C (Children)64 
presented a more viable option, which is to take a child home to die after 
futile treatment has been withdrawn, but this may only be viable if the 
doctors are supportive of palliative care (pain relief) in a private dwelling 
under “care” law (the Children Act 1989). The courts have not ruled on 
this matter yet, but should a disagreement arise in future and the courts 
agree with the doctors that palliative care is to be administered in hospital 
to avoid significant harm to the child, the parents have no legal avenue 
left except to plead that it is their “wish” to take their child home.  
How unreasonable is this wish? Two days after the European Court 
rejected their appeal, Chris and Connie posted devastated video messages 
on YouTube describing how they felt unable to control their son’s death 
(on Thursday 29th of June 2017):  
 
We’re not allowed to choose if our son lives and we’re not 
allowed to choose when or where Charlie dies. We know 
what day our son is going to die but don’t get a say in how 
that will happen.65 
 
The public did not feel that Chris and Connie were being 
unreasonable. On the morning of Mr Justice Francis’ decision to send 
                                                          
no legal authority yet on whether palliative care is regarded as “treatment” or 
simply “care.” 
63 [2014] EWHC 2964. 
64 [2016] EWCA Civ 374. 
65 D. Boyle. “Charlie Gard’s Parents Endure ‘Worst Day of Our Lives’ as 
Doctors to Switch Off Baby’s Life Support Within Hours,” The Telegraph, 30th 
June 2017. https://www.telegraph.co.uk; and M. Robinson. “Outpouring of 
Grief Worldwide for Baby Charlie Gard as his Parents say their Last Goodbyes 
to their Son as Doctors Switch Off his Life Support after Eight-month Battle,” 
Daily Mail, 30th June 2017. https://www.dailymail.co.uk. 




Charlie to a hospice, a family friend of Connie Yates posted on Facebook 
(on Thursday, 27th July 2017):  
 
the hospital has set the bar so high that in terms of [a] clinical 
team for Charlie’s end of life nothing seemed good enough 
for Great Ormond Street … Connie and Chris have 
conceded a hospice but it was not their first choice. They will 
be devastated they have not been granted their final wishes 
as parents.66  
 
This message reflected a wider sense of public anger that Chris and 
Connie’s final wishes were not respected. However, the public 
misunderstood three vital issues. First, it was simply not practical to 
administer futile intensive care in a ground floor flat. GOSH provided a 
number of reasons for this, including bulky equipment, no qualified 
experts, and the risk of an “unplanned and chaotic” death which would 
have been “unthinkable” for the parents.  
Secondly, and most importantly, the courts had already ruled that 
Charlie’s ventilation was futile, so it was not appropriate to continue it 
any further. It is here that the motives of the parents changed too: when 
they conceded on Monday, 24th July 2017,67 that Charlie was beyond 
medical help, their priorities switched from what was “best for him” to 
what was “preferable for us,” indicating that the best interests of Charlie 
had expired.  
Thirdly, and in a general moral sense, parents cannot control the 
natural death of their child. They can try to prevent death with proper 
parenting (e.g. road safety or good diet), and they can try to chase away 
the threat of death with medical treatment (e.g. chemotherapy), but when 
these options fail, and natural death is imminent, no parent has the luxury 
of asking for “one more week.” The crux of the two additional private 
hearings on Tuesday, 25th July 2017, and Thursday, 27th July 2017, was 
for Chris and Connie to control the time and location of Charlie’s death, 
but parents who tragically lose their children to grave genetic diseases do 
not have this luxury. Chris and Connie were ultimately playing God when 
a hand had already been dealt. They were attempting to postpone his 
                                                          
66 Press Association. “Anguish of Charlie Gard’s Mother as Judge Sets Timetable 
for End of his Life,” Daily Mail, 27th July 2017. https://www.dailymail.co.uk. 





natural death. The “right” so revered by the public would be better 





The answer to the opening question: “do parents have a right to 
determine where a child patient dies?” is that it depends. A request to 
continue futile intensive care at home (as per Charlie Gard) will not be 
in the best interests of the child. However, palliative care may be 
administered at home under the “care” provisions of the Children Act 
1989 if it is not considered to be “treatment” (the courts have not yet 
ruled on this matter but Re King and Re C provide good guidance as to 
how the “significant harm” test would apply). Ultimately, however, it is 
still not an absolute legal right as much as it is a “wish” that is subservient 
to nature taking its own course, the seriousness of the illness, and the 
complexity of pain relief required. 
There is one final theory to be considered: perhaps Chris and Connie 
attempted to control the death of their son because their control over his 
life had been removed? Was it a way of “repossessing” their own child? 
Their frustration was clear after the Court of Appeal ruling (Chris Gard): 
“When we got the appeal papers they said Connie Yates and Chris Gard 
against Great Ormond Street Hospital and Charlie Gard and yet he’s our 
son. It broke my heart when I saw that because how can that be right?”68 
Connie published an interview after Charlie had died, and the peaceful 
way she describes those few days at home suggests that all they really 
wanted was to be his parents again: 
 
Once home, it was lovely to sit and watch him, lying there 
like any other baby, not surrounded by equipment and 
machinery, without anything obscuring his lovely face. To 
just see our Charlie, at home, sleeping in his cot where he 
should be…it felt perfectly natural to leave the hospice with 
Charlie and take him home with us. We had got our last wish 
to bring him home, but Charlie was no longer alive. 
                                                          
68 S. Bell. “Charlie Gard Parents to Keep Fighting,” BBC News Online, 1st June 
2017. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news. 




Although it was upsetting, at least he was home – finally back 
where he belonged. It felt like he was ours again.69 
 
It is submitted that, if the myriad of legal actions and the adversarial 
legal documents had been replaced by non-technical mediation (e.g. no 
medical jargon or intimidating specialists) and a stronger emphasis was 
placed on the option of taking Charlie home to lie in state for a few days, 
perhaps Chris and Connie would have been more open to the idea of 
letting him die in a hospital or hospice, and would have had a glimmer 
of peace to look forward to in a world of chaotic darkness. 
                                                          
69 A. Smith-Squire. “Our Last Hours With Our Son: Charlie Gard’s Parents 
Emotionally Reveal How They Finally Brought Their Baby Home After he Died 
in a Hospice and Spent Several Days Saying Their Last Goodbye,” Daily Mail, 
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